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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The Internet and the number of people who use it have grown tremendously over 
the years. From the use of instant messaging to the emergence of companies like 
Google, Inc., the Internet has changed the way that people communicate and conduct 
business. In the last decade alone, worldwide Internet use has grown from just over 
360 million users in 2000 to over 1.9 billion users in 2010.1 As technology continues 
to improve, the number of people who use the Internet, and consume products and 
services over the Internet, will likely increase exponentially if past trends are any 
indication.
 As the Internet grows, “web-based businesses are increasingly [becoming] the 
subject of antitrust concerns”2 given the emergence and growth of large Internet 
companies such as Google, Yahoo!, eBay, and MySpace, to name a few.3 In his article 
Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, David S. Evans4 
discusses the development of the web-based economy, and identifies several antitrust 
issues that are expected to arise.5 Given that these issues are newly emerging in the 
1. Internet Usage Statistics, InternetWorldStats, http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated 
June 30, 2010).
2. David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Colloquy 285, 285 (2008); see, e.g., LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. 06-6994, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 43739 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008) (alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of 
Internet-based social networking sites, and advertising on Internet-based social networking sites); In re 
eBay Antitrust Litig., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (suit alleging tying of online payments 
service to transaction service); Person v. Google, Inc., No. 06-7297, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47920 (N.D. 
Cal. June 25, 2007) (suit alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of Internet advertising). 
In addition to a number of lawsuits filed, in 2007 the Federal Trade Commission investigated the 
acquisition of DoubleClick, Inc. by Google, and decided not to block it but expressed an intent to “closely 
watch” the markets involved in online advertising. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of FTC Concerning 
Google/DoubleClick, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/07
10170/071220statement.pdf. Beyond the United States, there have been claims in the European 
Community that Apple, Inc. has violated competition law by limiting the compatibility between its 
music players and music purchased from its competitors. See Evans, supra note 2, at 285 n.2.
3. See Evans, supra note 2, at 286.
4. David S. Evans is the editor-in-chief of Competition Policy International and chairs the editorial board of 
the CPI Antitrust Chronicle. Competition Pol’y Intern’l, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.
com/profile/show/8433 (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). In addition, he is:
A specialist on competition policy in the United States and European Union, a topic on 
which he has written and lectured extensively, David has served as an expert and 
testified before courts, arbitrators, regulatory authorities and legislatures in the United 
States and Europe. David is Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School and Visiting 
Professor, Faculty of Laws, University College London where he is one of the Executive 
Directors of Jevons Institute of Competition Law and Economics. From 1985 to 1995, 
he was an Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham Law School . . . where he taught 
antitrust law and economics.
 Id. He has also published seven books and seventy articles, many of which are on antitrust topics. Id. 
5. See generally Evans, supra note 2. The issues Evans identifies are “the emergence of impregnable 
monopolies,” “leveraging into adjacent markets,” “access to facilities,” “tying and bundling,” and 
“envelopment and predation.” Id. at 301–05. Evans describes “impregnable monopolies” as the 
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context of e-commerce, many of them have not yet found their way to the inside of a 
courtroom. Therefore, it is not entirely clear how courts will view and analyze the 
alleged anticompetitive behavior of these new and growing companies, nor is it entirely 
clear how courts will define the relevant markets in which these companies operate.
 Defining the relevant market is a particularly important aspect of an antitrust 
case. The manner in which courts define the relevant market in cases involving 
emerging Internet companies will determine whether such companies ultimately face 
antitrust liability.6 The definition of the relevant market enables agencies (specifically, 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice) and ultimately the 
courts to “discern market power by examining concentration in a defined market.”7 
“In defining the relevant . . . market, court[s] must determine which products 
compete with the defendant’s product and thus limit or prevent the exercise of market 
power.”8 Therefore, the more broadly a court defines the relevant market, the less 
likely it is that the defendant will have the ability to exercise monopoly power in that 
market. As a corollary, if the court determines that the defendant does not have the 
ability to exercise monopoly power in the market, it is less likely that the defendant 
will ultimately face antitrust liability.
 Given the importance of defining the relevant market in an antitrust case, this 
note attempts to predict how courts will define the relevant market for Internet 
companies facing antitrust liability. Part II of this note discusses the history of the 
Internet and its growth, and the resulting antitrust problems that are likely to arise. 
Part III is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the importance of 
defining a relevant market in an antitrust case, as well as the fact that it is not yet 
clear how courts will define the relevant antitrust market in cases involving Internet 
companies. The second section discusses the framework that courts use for defining 
the relevant antitrust market. Part IV predicts how courts will define the relevant 
antitrust market for Internet companies by analyzing three different types of Internet-
based businesses: advertisers, retailers, and social networking Web sites. This analysis 
is based on how courts have begun to deal with defining the relevant market in the 
few cases involving businesses in these three categories, as well as how courts have 
defined the relevant market in cases involving more traditional brick-and-mortar 
businesses.
“monopolization of certain [market] segments.” Id. at 302–03. “Leveraging into adjacent markets” refers 
to “dominant firms [seeking] to move into related markets for complementary products or services.” See 
id. at 303. An example is Google’s introduction of its Google Checkout payment system to compete 
with PayPal. Id. “Access to facilities” refers to issues that may arise from web platforms that close parts 
of themselves off. Id. at 303–04. For example, Facebook “does not allow search engines to crawl its web[ 
]site” and search its content. Id. at 304. “Envelopment and predation” refers to a situation where an 
Internet company “crushes” other companies by giving away free features and services that the other 
company charges its users for. Id. at 305.
6. See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Failure to identify a relevant 
market is a proper ground for dismissing a [monopolization] claim.”).
7. Andrew C. Hruska, Note, A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product Market Definition in Innovative 
Industries, 102 Yale L.J. 305, 305 (1992).
8. 2–10 Earl W. Kintner et al., Federal Antitrust Law § 10.1 (Supp. 2010). 
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ii. thE intErnEt
 A. A Brief History
 The Internet is a system of global “computer networks that are linked by both 
wired and wireless connections that interoperate through standard communication 
protocols.”9 “The Internet is at once a world wide broadcasting capability, a mechanism 
for information dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction 
between individuals and their computers without regard for geographic location.”10 
Indeed, the Internet has revolutionized the way that people do business and 
communicate with one another, from e-mail to online banking and from online 
shopping to even dating.11
 The idea for the Internet originated in the early 1960s by MIT professor, J.C.R. 
Licklider.12 Licklider referred to his vision as the “Galactic Network,” and pictured a 
system of globally interconnected computers that would enable users to access data 
and programs at quick speeds from anywhere in the world.13 Originally known as 
ARPANET, the Internet was first launched in 1969, and in its early stages was used 
by computer experts, engineers, scientists, and librarians.14 At that point, personal 
computers did not exist, so those who used the Internet were required to learn an 
extremely complex system.15 In fact, ARPANET was comprised of only four 
computers at its inception.16
 The 1970s was a decade of progress for the Internet, and by 1972 nineteen 
additional computers were added to ARPANET, for a total of twenty-three host 
computers that formed the backbone of the network.17 That same year, e-mail was 
adapted for ARPANET.18 E-mail was regarded as the “killer app” that “changed the 
[I]nternet forever” by helping to spread ARPANET in its early days, as well as 
9. Evans, supra note 2, at 287. “A communication protocol is the set of standard rules for data representation, 
signaling, authentication and error detection required to send information over a communications 
channel.” Communications Protocol Definition, Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.websters-
online-dictionary.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
10. Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society, http://www.isoc.org/internet/
history/brief.shtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
11. See History of the Internet, History of Things, http://www.historyofthings.com/history-of-the-internet 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
12. See Leiner, supra note 10.
13. See id.
14. See Walt Howe, A Brief History of the Internet: An Anecdotal History of the People and Communities that 
Brought About the Internet and the Web, Walt Howe, http://www.walthowe.com/navnet/history.html 
(last updated March 24, 2010).
15. See id.
16. See History of the Internet, supra note 11.
17. See id.
18. Leiner, supra note 10.
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fueling growth for the future.19 ARPANET soon expanded to Europe and, by 1979, 
111 computers were linked to the network.20
 The 1980s marked a decade of tremendous growth as technical innovation helped 
to bring the Internet closer to what we know it to be today.21 During this time, 
computers became more affordable and became commonplace within universities 
and businesses, and ultimately came within the budget of individuals.22 This increase 
in computer access led to the development of “many new organizations . . . to help 
manage the . . . new users that were utilizing the Internet,” and by the end of 1989 
the number of computer hosts on the Internet reached 200,000 from 150 at the 
beginning of the decade.23 By the early 1990s, the speed at which information could 
be transmitted had increased and the Internet had about 300,000 host computers; by 
the end of the decade, the number had reached the hundreds of millions.24
 The commercial web,25 as we know it today, appeared around “1995 with the 
introduction of browsers that made web navigation easier for regular computer 
users.”26 “Browsers are necessary to view text and media on the web,”27 and their 
introduction encouraged the formation of businesses directed toward mass audiences.28 
As more businesses developed on the web, it became clear that many of their business 
models did not enable them to make money.29 As a result, many of these businesses 
lost their market capitalization and disappeared during the bubble burst of 2001.30 
However, the bubble burst did not destroy the web-based economy, and the firms 
that emerged created new services and new ways of doing business.31
19. History of the Internet, supra note 11. See also Terry W. Posey, Jr., You’ve Got Service!, 28 Dayton L. Rev. 
403, 411 (2003) (“[T]he original ‘killer app’ for the Internet was email.”). A “killer app” is “an application 
that becomes so indispensable to the way people work that it creates a larger market for the operating 
systems and platforms for which it is available.” Id. at 411 n.46 (citation omitted).





25. The Web (short for the World Wide Web) refers to the products and services that rely on the Internet’s 
physical communication system. Evans, supra note 2, at 288.
26. Id. 
27. See History of the Internet, supra note 11. The dominant browser today used by Windows computers is 
Internet Explorer, although other browsers exist, such as Mozilla’s Firefox, Google’s Chrome, and 
Apple’s Safari, to name a few. Id. 
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 B. The Internet Today and Antitrust
 Indeed, the Internet has come a long way from its humble beginnings as an idea 
for the “Galactic Network.” Today, in North America, over a quarter of a billion 
people, or 77.4% of the population, have access to the Internet.32 As of December 
2007, 78% of all Internet users in the United States used webmail, and 39% of United 
States users used instant messaging.33 People can use the Internet to do their 
banking,34 order groceries,35 purchase books,36 or even date.37 And, as technology 
improves, the number of Internet users is likely to increase. For example, individuals 
currently consume Internet products and services mainly through personal computers; 
but as more mobile phones around the world become capable of connecting to the 
Internet, more people will likely connect more frequently and for longer periods of 
time.38 Given that mobile phones are less expensive and more widely held than 
personal computers, this will likely increase not only the consumption of web-based 
products and services by current Internet users, but will likely increase consumption 
by new Internet users, especially in less-developed countries.39
 The growth of the Internet and the number of people who use it has led to the 
emergence of “global gargantuan firms . . . which will likely attract scrutiny by 
competition authorities.” 40 For example, in the United States, Google has 
approximately a 69% share of the online advertising market,41 and eBay has close to 
a 100% share of auction page views.42 In fact, some of these “gargantuan firms” have 
already come under antitrust scrutiny,43 and further antitrust issues are likely to arise 
based upon the probable evolution of the Internet and web-based businesses.44 These 
antitrust issues will likely be premised upon anticompetitive behavior stemming from 
the alleged monopoly power that these large firms wield in the relevant market.45
32. Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 1. 
33. Evans, supra note 2, at 289. Worldwide, 69% of Internet users used webmail and 47% used instant 
messenger. Id. 
34. E.g., Bank of Am., http://www.bankofamerica.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
35. E.g., NetGrocer, http://www.netgrocer.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
36. E.g., Amazon, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
37. E.g., Match, http://www.match.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
38. Evans, supra note 2, at 289.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 286.
41. See DoubleClick Deal Means Google Controls 69% of the Online Ad Market, Internet Marketing News 
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.browsermedia.co.uk/2008/04/01/doubleclick-deal-means-google-controls-
69-of-the-online-ad-market/.
42. Evans, supra note 2, at 299–300.
43. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
44. See Evans, supra note 2, at 302.
45. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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iii. dEfining thE rELEVant MarKEt
 A. The Importance of Defining the Relevant Market
 In the United States, many of the predicted antitrust issues will likely arise under 
sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act, as these 
statutes deal with unlawful monopolization.46 Under these statutes, courts must 
define the relevant market that a firm is alleged to monopolize to determine whether 
the firm actually possesses monopoly power.47 The relevant market definition is 
significant because if a firm does not possess monopoly power in the relevant market, 
it cannot violate the antitrust statutes that proscribe monopolization.
 While newly emerging Internet companies may very well raise antitrust concerns, 
it is not certain how the relevant antitrust markets in which these companies operate 
will be defined. This is due to the fact that courts have not yet had much experience 
defining these markets. David S. Evans, the scholar who has predicted many of these 
antitrust issues,48 even recognizes that defining the relevant market for these Internet 
firms involves some uncertainty. In discussing the large segment shares that some 
Internet companies possess, Evans acknowledged that “one can debate whether these 
segments correspond to well-defined antitrust markets.”49 Evans also conceded that 
the dominant shares held by companies like Google and eBay are only in “putative 
46. Section 3 of the Clayton Act states in part that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to lease or make a sale or 
contract for sale of goods . . . or other commodities . . . for use, consumption or resale 
within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any 
insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a 
price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, 
agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in 
the goods . . . or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or 
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, 
agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create 
a monopoly in any line of commerce.
 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006 & Supp. 2010). Section 7 of the Clayton Act states in part that “[n]o person engaged 
in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any 
part of the stock or other share capital . . . where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006 & Supp. 2010). Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act states in part that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2 
(2006 & Supp. 2010).
47. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (“[D]etermination of the relevant market 
is a necessary predicate to finding a violation of the Clayton Act, because the threatened monopoly must 
be one which will substantially lessen competition within the area of effective competition.”) (quoting 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)); United States v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394–410 (1956) (discussing the need to define the relevant 
market in cases arising under § 2 of the Sherman Act).
48. See supra notes 4–5.
49. Evans, supra note 2, at 301.
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antitrust markets”50 and “are not necessarily relevant antitrust markets.”51 Given this 
uncertainty and the importance of defining the relevant market, this note attempts 
to predict how courts will define the relevant antitrust market for web-based 
businesses. First, however, it is necessary to discuss the framework courts use for 
defining the relevant market.
 B. The Relevant Market Framework
 The Supreme Court has defined a monopoly as “the power to control prices or 
exclude competition.”52 A patent is an example of a classic monopoly because the 
patent holder has sole control over the use of his patent, and can exclude others from 
using it.53 Conversely, perfect competition54 exists in a market where many buyers 
and sellers can freely exchange a standardized product, such as wheat or salt.55
 As producers are able to differentiate standardized products in the way of quality, 
design, or use, competition diminishes as the producer’s “power over price and 
competition of its product” increases.56 Therefore, a seller may essentially have a 
“monopoly on [a] certain trade because of location, as an isolated country store or filling 
station, or because no one else makes a product of just the quality or attractiveness of 
his product.”57 In this sense, every seller of a non-standardized product may be 
considered a monopolist, since each seller has exclusive control over the production and 
price of its product.58 However, this is not what creates an illegal monopoly under the 
antitrust statutes; “[i]llegal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive market 
for the product.”59 The overall competitive market for a given product depends on how 
similar products are to one another and how far buyers are willing to go to substitute 
one product for the other.60 Therefore, to determine whether a firm maintains illegal 
monopoly power in a market, it is necessary to define the relevant market, which is 
50. Id. at 286.
51. Id. at 286 n.6.
52. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391.
53. See id. at 392.
54. Perfect competition is “[a] completely efficient market situation characterized by numerous buyers and 
sellers, a homogeneous product, perfect information for all parties, and complete freedom to move in 
and out of the market. Perfect competition rarely if ever exists, but antitrust scholars often use the 
theory as a standard for measuring market performance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 323 (9th ed. 
2009).
55. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 392.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 392–93.
58. Id. at 393.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 393. 
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comprised of the relevant geographic market (how far buyers will travel) and the 
relevant product market (how similar products are).61
  1. Defining the Relevant Geographic Market
 When examining a market in an antitrust case, courts must define the relevant 
geographic market. While the analyses of the geographic and product markets are 
distinct, “courts use the same principles in defining the geographic market as they do 
in defining the product market.”62 The definition of the relevant “geographic market 
encompasses the geographic area to which consumers can practically turn for 
alternative sources of the product” involved, as well as the geographic area where “the 
antitrust defendants face competition.”63 In determining where consumers can 
practically turn for alternatives, and where the defendant faces competition, courts 
will look at the “barriers to transactions between buyers and sellers of different 
locations,” which include “transportation costs” and the “relative preferences of 
consumers with respect to travel and price.”64 Therefore, even if a product or service 
is available nationwide, the relevant “geographic market may be confined by the fact 
that it can be impractical for consumers to travel great distances to procure particular 
services,”65 or by the fact that consumers may be unwilling to travel at all.66
  2. Defining the Relevant Product Market
 In addition to defining the geographic market in an antitrust case, it is necessary 
to define the relevant product market to determine “which products compete with 
the defendant’s product and thus limit or prevent the exercise of market power.”67 A 
company does not maintain an illegal monopoly over a product simply because its 
product is different from other products.68 If this were the case, then “only physically 
identical products would be part of the [relevant] market.”69 Therefore, in order to 
61. See Charles Carson Eblen, Defining the Geographic Market in Modern Commerce: The Effect of Globalization 
and E-Commerce on Tampa Electric and Its Progeny, 56 Baylor L. Rev. 49, 53 (2004); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (“The ‘area of effective competition’ must be determined by 
reference to a product market . . . and geographic market . . . .”) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)).
62. See Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.15.
63. See Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Morgenstern v. 
Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
64. Id. at 228.
65. Id.
66. See id. A confined geographic market definition may be found to exist in certain service industries 
where the service can only be offered from a particular location. Examples of such services include those 
provided by banks, hospitals, theaters, and ski resorts. 2–10 Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.15.
67. Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.1.
68. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956).
69. Id.
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determine the products that comprise a relevant market, the Supreme Court has 
instructed courts to look at the products that are reasonably interchangeable with the 
product that is alleged to monopolize, as well the products that are viewed as actual 
substitutes by consumers.70 In this vein, the Court has noted that the antitrust 
statutes do not require that “products be fungible to be considered [part of] the 
relevant market”; but at the same time, the definition of substitutes cannot be given 
an “infinite range.”71
 When determining whether products are reasonably interchangeable, courts will 
define the relevant market to include products that consumers actually view as 
substitutes for the defendant’s products.72 Accordingly, courts give weight to actual 
consumer purchasing patterns.73 However, courts will also examine the functional 
interchangeability of products; that is, the court will look at whether products can 
perform the same function, regardless of whether consumers view the products as 
actual substitutes.74 Additionally, consumers’ failure to investigate all product sources 
does not mean that consumers’ actual purchase patterns necessarily define the 
market.75
 While it is difficult to provide concrete examples of relevant markets because “[t]
he ‘market’ which one must study to determine when a producer has monopoly power 
will vary with the part of commerce under consideration,”76 a look at United States v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.77 may be useful to help contextualize the above 
discussion. In E.I. du Pont, the Supreme Court established the doctrinal framework 
for defining the relevant product market. The government alleged that E.I. du Pont 
had monopolized the market for cellophane.78 The government argued that the 
product market was only cellophane, while E.I. du Pont argued that the relevant 
product market was all “f lexible packaging materials,” which included wax paper, 
70. See id. at 394–95 (“What is called for is an appraisal of the ‘cross-elasticity’ of demand in the trade. . . . 
In considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition, no 
more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for 
the same purposes make up that ‘part of the trade or commerce,’ monopolization of which may be 
illegal.”); see also 2–10 Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.1 (“[T]he Court in du Pont looked to 1) ‘functional 
interchangeability’ and 2) actual substitution by consumers or ‘cross-elasticity’ of demand.”).
71. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 394.
72. See Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.3.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 10.2.
75. Id. § 10.3 (citing Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 86 F. Supp. 2d 154, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)) (“All of 
[the] choices—whether a particular buyer decides to consider them, or instead ignore all options but 
one—must be included in the relevant market.”); Id. (citing Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 514 (3d Cir. 1998)) (“Product market definition turns on the existence of close 
substitutes for a particular product, not on the ability of any particular consumer to switch effortlessly to 
such substitutes.”).
76. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 404.
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 378.
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aluminum foil, and parchment paper, among other materials.79 The government 
asserted that the markets for cellophane and the other packaging materials were 
distinct because cellophane and the other materials were neither “substantially 
fungible nor like priced.”80 The Court, in holding that the relevant market was all 
f lexible packaging materials, examined the desirable characteristics of cellophane as 
compared to other packaging materials;81 the “degree of functional interchangeability” 
of cellophane with the other materials;82 and the “cross-elasticity of demand.”83 With 
respect to functional interchangeability, for example, the Court found that “cellophane 
had no qualities not possessed by many other materials,” and that, for certain 
purposes, cellophane had actually lost a portion of its packaging business to the other 
materials.84 In concluding that the relevant market was all f lexible packaging 
materials that the Court cited the lower court’s opinion:
The record establishes plain cellophane and moistureproof cellophane are 
each f lexible packaging materials which are functionally interchangeable with 
other f lexible packaging materials and sold at same time to same customers 
for same purpose at competitive prices; there is no cellophane market distinct 
and separate from the market for f lexible packaging materials; the market for 
f lexible packaging materials is the relevant market for determining nature 
and extent of duPont’s market control; and duPont has at all times competed 
with other cellophane producers and manufacturers of other f lexible packaging 
materials in all aspects of its cellophane business.85
 In addition to examining the availability of substitutes within the broad market, 
the Supreme Court, subsequent to the E.I. du Pont case, introduced the concept of 
submarkets. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court stated that “within [the] 
broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute 
product markets for antitrust purposes.”86 The Court went on to note that “[t]he 
boundaries of . . . a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia 
as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the 
product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct 
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.”87 
For example, in Brown Shoe, the Court recognized submarkets for men’s, women’s, 
and children’s shoes within the broader market of shoes.88 Although the Supreme 
79. Id. at 393–94, 423.
80. Id. at 380.
81. Id. at 398.
82. Id. at 399.
83. Id. at 399–400.
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 403.
86. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
87. Id.
88. See id. at 301.
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Court has acknowledged that submarkets may exist, the Court itself has cautioned 
against disregarding the broader market in favor of a relevant submarket,89 and both 
lower courts90 and commentators have criticized the idea of submarkets generally.91
iV. thE intErnEt: hOW WiLL COUrts dEfinE thE rELEVant MarKEt?
 A. The Geographic Market
 When antitrust cases involving Internet companies come before the courts, one 
issue that will arise is how the geographic market will be defined. As previously 
noted, “[t]he Internet is at once a world-wide broadcasting capability, a mechanism 
for information dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction 
between individuals and their computers without regard for geographic location.”92 
The Internet has no borders, and in a sense, it is everywhere, yet nowhere all at once. 
A person in New York and a person in Hawaii can both be on the same Web site, at 
the same time, without leaving the comfort of their living rooms. Yet the Internet is 
not a physical place where one can say, “I’ll be back in five minutes, I’m going to pick 
something up on the Internet.” This unique feature of the Internet presents an 
interesting question as to how courts will define the geographic market in which 
Internet companies operate for purposes of antitrust analyses.
 One possible geographic-market definition for Internet companies is the Internet 
itself.93 Such a definition may make sense if the defendant’s product is only available 
on the Internet, and cannot be purchased from a brick-and-mortar business. In such 
an instance, there is no alternative geographic area in which consumers can practically 
acquire the product, nor is there another geographic area in which the antitrust 
89. See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, 402 U.S. 549, 553 (1971) (quoting United States v. Phillipsburg 
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360 (1970)) (“[S]ubmarkets are not a basis for the disregard of a 
broader line of commerce that has economic significance.”).
90. See Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.5 n.69 (citing Satellite Television & Associated Res., Inc. v. Cont’l 
Cablevision of Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983)).
The use of the term ‘submarket’ is to be avoided; it adds only confusion to an already 
imprecise and complex endeavor. For antitrust purposes a product group or geographic 
area either meets the listed criteria, in which case it is a relevant market; or it does not, 
in which case it is irrelevant for purposes of analysis. No fiddling with nomenclature 
will change the analysis or result.
 Id.; Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 n.9 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (“‘[T]he 
emerging consensus’ of antitrust scholars and [the] case law seems to be that the term ‘submarket’ is 
unnecessary.”); In re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1458 
n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (“The term submarket will not be used in this memorandum because the prefix 
‘sub’ merely creates confusion and is superf luous.”).
91. See Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.5 n.70 (citing Lawrence C. Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and 
Monopolization Cases, 72 Geo. L.J. 39, 40 (1983)) (criticizing the submarket concept); Id. (citing Robert 
Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1805, 1849 
n.182 (1990)) (arguing that submarkets never had any theoretical justification and created confusion). 
92. Leiner, supra note 10.
93. See Eblen, supra note 61, at 79. 
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defendant faces competition. In this respect, the Internet would seem to satisfy a 
geographic-market definition.
 However, there are two problems with this approach. First, defining the 
geographic market as the Internet raises the glaring issue that the Internet is not a 
geographic location, and courts have always required that the geographic market be 
defined by geography in cases alleging an unlawful monopoly.94 This is exactly the 
holding in one of the only cases to address this issue. In America Online, Inc. v. 
GreatDeals.Net, a case involving section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Eastern District 
of Virginia refused to define the relevant geographic market as the Internet, stating:
With respect to the relevant geographic market in which competition takes 
place, the Court finds that the Internet cannot be defined with outer 
boundaries. It is not a place or location; it is infinite. The Internet is a “giant 
network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer 
networks.” The network “allows any of literally tens of millions of people 
with access to the Internet to exchange information.”95
The court in America Online seemed to suggest that the relevant geographic market 
must be a physical place; a place that can be “defined with outer boundaries.”96 The 
court also went on to intimate that although the Internet may be “infinite,” the 
geographic locations of the individuals using the Internet should be considered in 
defining the geographic market.97 Additionally, the court appeared to suggest that 
substitute products were available in physical geographic locations,98 which leads to 
the second problem of defining the geographic market as the Internet.
 The second problem is that brick-and-mortar substitutes for Internet products 
and services exist because there will often be businesses in physical, geographic 
locations that sell products or services that are possible substitutes for those sold by 
Internet companies.99 For the purposes of defining the geographic market, however, 
it is sufficient to say that when brick-and-mortar substitutes exist, courts will 
undoubtedly need to define the relevant geographic market in a manner that accounts 
for the locations of all such substitutes.
94. See id. at 56–59.
95. Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Va. 1999) (quoting Cyber 
Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
96. See id.
97. See Am. Online, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (“The geographic market may not be restricted to AOL subscribers 
not only because there are other persons with access to the Internet, but also because there are other 
means of advertising to those persons and to AOL subscribers.”). Given the court’s statement that the 
geographic market cannot be restricted to AOL subscribers, or even to people with Internet access, one 
may conclude that the geographic location of AOL subscribers and other individuals must be taken into 
account when defining the geographic market.
98. See id. at 858 (“There are numerous substitutes for e-mail advertising, some of which are less expensive, 
including use of the World Wide Web, direct mail, billboards, television, newspapers, radio, and 
leaf lets, to name a few.”).
99. These possible substitutes will be analyzed in the next section, which will discuss how courts will define 
the relevant product market. See infra Part IV.
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 Given that the geographic-market definition will depend on whether brick-and-
mortar substitutes are available, the product-market definition will likely become 
increasingly significant, with the geographic-market definition becoming less 
important in the relevant market analysis where Internet companies are involved. 
Therefore, the first step in defining the relevant market in which Internet companies 
operate will be to define the product market.
 When the product market consists of only products or services available on the 
Internet, the geographic market will still need to be “defined with outer boundaries” 
as a “place or location” in order to actually satisfy a geographic market definition. This 
point is illustrated in LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc.,100 where the plaintiff in a 
section 2 Sherman Act case alleged the relevant antitrust market to be “Internet-based 
social networking in the geographic region of the United States.”101 In discussing the 
relevant market, the Central District of California spent most of its time discussing 
the product market, and approved the plaintiff ’s geographic market definition as the 
United States, as opposed to the entire Internet, in just a few sentences.102
 When the product market contains products available from brick-and-mortar 
businesses, however, the geographic market will need to be defined in a way that 
accounts for these businesses. Therefore, once the product market is defined to 
include brick-and-mortar businesses, the geographic market will logically follow and 
include the geographic locations of those brick-and-mortar businesses, as those are 
locations where consumers can practically turn to purchase substitutes to the products 
or services sold on the Internet.103
 B. The Product Market
 For the purposes of predicting how courts will define the relevant product market 
for Internet companies, this note will examine three categories of Internet businesses: 
advertisers (i.e., Google and Yahoo!); retailers or companies that sell tangible products 
(i.e., eBay and Amazon.com); and social networking Web sites (i.e., MySpace and 
Facebook).104 This note predicts that when defining the relevant product market, courts 
will define the market broadly for Internet retailers and advertisers to include both 
traditional brick-and-mortar business and Internet businesses, but will define the 
market narrowly for social networking Web sites to include Internet businesses only.
100. No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43739 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007).
101. Id. at *10.
102. See id. at *16 (citing Am. Online, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 851). For a discussion of how the court defined the 
relevant product market, see infra text accompanying notes 137–42.
103. For a further discussion of defining the relevant geographic market, see Eblen, supra note 61, at 53. In 
contrast to this note, which discusses how courts should define the relevant antitrust market when 
Internet companies are the subject of antitrust scrutiny, Eblen discusses the extent to which Internet 
companies should be included in the relevant geographic market where they compete with brick-and-
mortar sellers when the brick-and-mortar sellers are the subject of antitrust scrutiny. Id.
104. These categories are not intended to be exhaustive, and they are not an attempt to categorize every type 
of Internet business. The categories contain some of the largest Internet companies in existence, and 
will help to illustrate how courts may go about defining the relevant antitrust market. 
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  1. Advertising
 There are various ways to advertise on the Internet, ranging from search 
advertising to banner advertising to pop-up advertisements.105 One possible way to 
define the relevant product market for Internet advertising is to divide the different 
forms of online advertising into submarkets. This is essentially the approach the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) took during a 2007 investigation of the proposed 
acquisition of DoubleClick, Inc. by Google.106 While the FTC did not explicitly 
define the submarkets it believed to exist, its official statement from the investigation 
revealed that the FTC nevertheless contemplated several submarkets in its 
consideration of the relevant market based upon advertisers’ willingness to substitute 
one form of online advertising for another.
 First, the FTC’s investigation found that advertisers purchase advertising space 
online in two ways: they purchase advertising space from search engine providers, 
such as Google, and from web content providers.107 Within the category of purchases 
from web content providers,108 the FTC discussed two channels through which 
content providers sell advertisements—direct and indirect sales.109 With direct sales, 
content providers use their own sales force to sell advertisement space, and with 
indirect sales, content providers use advertisement intermediation firms to place 
advertisements on the content provider’s Web site.110 The FTC’s investigation found 
that advertisers do not consider advertising intermediation to be a substitute for 
directly placed advertising.111
 The FTC also discussed contextual advertising, which is an advertising channel 
used by certain advertisement intermediation firms.112 The FTC found that 
advertisers do not consider contextual advertisements to be substitutes for directly 
purchased advertisements. At the same time, the FTC found that contextual 
advertisements do not constitute a separate market, but are part of a broad market 
comprised of all advertisements sold by intermediaries.113
105. See Marshall Brain, How Web Advertising Works, How Stuff Works, http://www.howstuffworks.com/
web-advertising.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
106. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC File No. 071-0170, Statement of Federal Trade Commission 
Concerning Google/DoubleClick, 3 (2007) [hereinafter FTC Statement], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf.
107. Id.
108. A content provider is “[a]n organization or individual that creates information, educational or 
entertainment content for the Internet . . . .” Content Provider Definition, PCMag, http://www.pcmag.
com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=content+provider&i=40275,00.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
109. FTC Statement, supra note 106, at 3–4.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id. at 5. “Contextual ad[vertisement]s are predominantly text ad[vertisement]s that are delivered to a 
web page using technology that scans the text of a web page for key words and delivers ad[vertisement]s 
to the page based on what the user is viewing.” Id.
113. Id. at 5–6.
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 While the FTC discussed different forms of online advertising and the purchasing 
behavior of advertisers, it did not explicitly state that certain forms of online 
advertising comprised distinct submarkets. The FTC, nevertheless, made it clear 
that it did not consider all forms of online advertising to be a part of the same relevant 
product market:
It has been suggested that the [acquisition of DoubleClick by Google] . . . 
would eliminate competition . . . in an “all online advertising” market that 
would include search advertising, ads sold through intermediaries, and 
directly sold ad inventory. The evidence, however, indicates that all online 
advertising does not constitute a relevant antitrust market. Advertisers 
purchase different types of ad inventory for different purposes, and one type 
does not significantly constrain the pricing of another. For instance, advertisers 
primarily purchase search advertising space to implement direct response ad 
campaigns, while directly sold ad inventory is generally purchased for brand 
advertising campaigns.114
 Although the FTC found that all online advertising does not constitute a relevant 
antitrust market and suggested that submarkets exist, it is unlikely that courts will 
adopt the FTC’s approach when defining the relevant product market for online 
advertisers. First, as already discussed, the idea of submarkets has been rejected by 
many courts and commentators.115 Additionally, at least one court has rejected the 
idea of submarkets in the context of online advertising. In Person v. Google, Inc., the 
Northern District of California found that keyword-targeted Internet advertising 
(where advertisers pay to have their advertisements placed near the search results 
produced by a search engine) was not a relevant product market, and stated:
The Court finds no basis for distinguishing the Search Ad Market from the 
larger market for Internet advertising. Search-based advertising is reasonably 
interchangeable with other forms of Internet advertising. A website may 
choose to advertise via search-based advertising or by posting advertisements 
independently of any search. The Search Ad Market thus is too narrow to 
form a relevant market for antitrust purposes.116
 Furthermore, neither the FTC nor the court in Person considered that courts 
could possibly define the relevant market more broadly than just online advertising, 
and include traditional methods of advertising such as television, radio, and newspaper 
advertising in the relevant product market. Courts have found that different forms of 
advertising are substitutes for one another because “[a]ll advertising performs the 
same function of introducing and maintaining public awareness of the retailers’ 
114. Id. at 7.
115. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
116. Person v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-07297 JF (RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22499, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 16, 2007); see also KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22637, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
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product.”117 In fact, the court in America Online held that various forms of advertising 
are substitutes for one form of online advertising—e-mailed advertisements—and 
stated that “[t]here are numerous substitutes for e-mail advertising, some of which 
are less expensive, including use of the World Wide Web, direct mail, billboards, 
television, newspapers, radio, and leaflets, to name a few.”118
 Internet advertising does, in fact, perform the same function as the other forms 
of more traditional advertising mentioned, and it accomplishes its function in a 
similar manner. Content placed on Web sites, such as non-interactive banner 
advertisements, is no different than advertisements placed on the page of a newspaper 
or magazine, and online video advertisements are no different than television 
commercials. Readers of Web sites and newspapers alike will both receive messages 
on a page they are viewing in exactly the same manner. For example, if Walt Disney 
Co. were to place an advertisement in a newspaper and then place the identical 
advertisement on a webpage, the viewer of that advertisement, in either medium, 
would receive exactly the same message. Additionally, both Internet and traditional 
advertisers use information regarding consumer interests to place their advertising.119 
“As they do in other media, [Internet] advertisers wishing to direct their advertising 
to customers based on their interests must decide where to place advertising after 
determining which websites are popular with the advertisers’ target customers.”120 
Indeed, Internet content advertising is functionally interchangeable with other forms 
of advertising, even if some “[a]dvertisers view online content providers 
differently.”121
 Although Internet search advertising (as distinguished from the content 
advertising just discussed) differs from more traditional forms of advertising and may 
be considered “unique,”122 the former still serves the same function as its more 
traditional counterpart. Search advertising provides advertisements to consumers 
based on terms they enter into a search engine.123 Google’s AdWords program, for 
example, allows advertisers to purchase keywords. When the purchased keyword is 
117. Huron Valley Publ’g Co. v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 659, 662 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (holding 
newspaper advertising does not constitute relevant product market; all forms of advertising must be 
considered); see also Berlyn, Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 73 Fed. App’x 576, 583 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(holding television, radio, and print advertising to be part of the same relevant market as they “are 
competing for the same limited pool of advertisers’ dollars”).
118. Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Va. 1999).
119. See, e.g., How does Google target ads to my website?, Google AdSense, http://www.google.com/support/
adsense/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=9713 (last visited Sept. 20, 2010); Ambarish Chandra & Ulrich 
Kaiser, Targeted Advertising in Magazine Markets, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1653435 (Aug. 31, 2010); Targeted Advertising, Time Inc., http://www.timeinc.com/clients/
advertising.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2010) (discussing Time Inc.’s targeted advertising divisions for 
both magazine and online advertising).
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entered as a search term into Google’s search engine by a user, the keyword triggers 
the advertiser’s advertisement, and a link to the advertiser’s Web site.124 Based on the 
keywords that an advertiser purchases, a search for the term “football,” for example, 
may trigger advertisements for replica jerseys or sporting goods stores.125 This is not 
entirely different from more traditional forms of advertising. Just as an advertiser 
using Google’s AdWords program can choose the keywords that trigger its 
advertisement, an advertiser using more traditional forms of advertising can choose 
the type of publication that “triggers” its advertisement. For example, a person who 
purchases a print copy of TENNIS Magazine will likely “trigger” advertisements for 
tennis rackets or tennis pro shops because those advertisers target readers of that 
magazine. While this analogy is admittedly an oversimplification of how search 
advertising works, it illustrates the point that search advertising serves the same 
function as more traditional advertising, and it raises some of the issues that courts 
may encounter when defining the relevant antitrust market. Accordingly, the relevant 
market definition for online advertising will need to take into account the non-
Internet options that advertisers have available to them.
  2. Retail
 Online marketplaces and auction sites such as Amazon.com and eBay sell a 
variety of products, including books, electronics, and clothing, to name a few. One 
way of defining the relevant market might be the market for online book sales, or 
online electronics sales, etc. The problem with these possible definitions is the same 
problem associated with defining the advertising market as online advertising—they 
are too narrow because they fail to take into account substitutes that are available 
from brick-and-mortar sellers. This problem was evident in Gerlinger v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., where the Northern District of California observed that the plaintiff was unable 
to offer anything but “unsupported allegations that there is a separate and distinct 
‘online market segment’” for books.126
 Another possible definition is the market for online auctions, in the case of eBay, 
or the market for online marketplaces, in the case of Amazon.com. This was the 
approach taken by plaintiffs in In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litigation.127 The plaintiffs 
in eBay alleged seven antitrust violations, including claims that eBay monopolized or 
attempted to monopolize the market for online auctions.128 The plaintiffs, in their 
124. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2009); see also, Where will my ads appear?, 
Google AdWords, https://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6119 (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2010).
125. FTC Statement, supra note 106, at 3.
126. Gerlinger v. Amazon.com Inc., 311 F.Supp. 2d 838, 851 (N.D. Cal. 2004). In this case the plaintiff 
challenged an agreement between Amazon.com, Inc., an online bookseller, and Borders Group, Inc., a 
retail bookseller, and alleged several antitrust violations including illegal price fixing and attempted 
monopolization. See id. at 840, 845, 851. 
127. 545 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
128. Id. at 1029.
289
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
complaint, described eBay as a place where “buyers can search for auction listings for 
specific items or search by category, key word, seller name, recently commenced 
auctions or auctions about to end,” but did not go further in describing the online 
auction market.129
 The problem with accepting the relevant product market as the online auction 
market is that such a definition fails to “acknowledge that alternatives to eBay . . . 
exist[,] let alone distinguish [it] from the pool of obvious substitutes.”130 As noted 
previously, a wide variety of items are available for sale on eBay, ranging from cars to 
electronics to musical instruments.131 A market definition of online auctions fails to 
consider that online auctions are not the only place to purchase the items for sale in 
eBay’s marketplace, and it also fails to consider that online auctions do not serve as 
the only means for buyers and sellers to transact such items.132
After all, long before eBay [and other online marketplaces were] conceived, 
buyers and sellers of products ranging from cars to computer equipment to 
comic books found ways to complete sales. They gathered together and still 
meet through classified ads (both online and off line), car dealerships, 
department stores, comic book conventions and everywhere else that people 
buy and sell things.133
eBay further elaborated on the possible substitutes to online auctions:
Someone looking, for example, to buy a pair of speakers for a home stereo has 
many options. That person might visit a shopping mall, Best Buy or a boutique 
home electronics store. A more adventurous (or more informed) buyer might 
thumb through classifieds, scan listings on Craigslist.com, type “speakers” 
into an Internet search engine, check Amazon.com or visit eBay.com. The 
same is true for someone looking to sell speakers. A would-be seller might 
post a note on a local bulletin board, host a garage sale, place an ad in a local 
newspaper, put a listing on Craigslist.com, list the item on eBay.com or put 
the item up for sale somewhere else on the Internet.134
 Although the Northern District of California denied eBay’s motion to dismiss, it 
did not accept the plaintiffs’ market definition, and it did not define the market at 
such an early stage of the litigation. In fact, the court acknowledged that there may 
be problems with the plaintiffs’ relevant market definition, stating that the “plaintiffs’ 
129. Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 9, In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litigation, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1027 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C-07-01882-(JF)). 
130. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 9, In re eBay Antitrust Litigation, 
545 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C-07-01882-(JF)). This problem is similar to the problem 
that results when the product market for online advertising is defined as the online advertising market. 
Such a definition fails to consider the brick-and-mortar-substitutes that are available.
131. See eBay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
132. See Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 130, at 9.
133. See id.
134. Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint at 3, In re eBay Antitrust Litigation, 
545 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C-07-01882-JF).
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market is narrowly defined and may be implausible as a theoretical matter.” 135 
However, the court held that at that stage of the litigation the plaintiffs’ allegations 
were sufficient to allow the plaintiffs to move forward to prove the relevant market 
that they had alleged. 136
 Though the court did not dismiss the complaint outright, it seems clear that 
there are a variety of functional substitutes to an online auction market that exist 
both in brick-and-mortar businesses as well as on the Internet. The narrow market 
definition of online auctions does not encompass all of these substitutes, and in 
analyzing antitrust claims that arise, courts will need to consider these substitutes 
when determining what the relevant market is.
  3. Social Networking
 “Social networking websites allow visitors to create personal profiles containing 
text, graphics, and videos, as well as to view profiles of their friends and other users 
with similar interests.”137 Unlike online advertising and online marketplaces, social 
networking sites do not have readily identifiable substitutes that exist in brick-and-
mortar businesses. In fact, social networking Web sites are a relatively new concept 
and represent a new product that does not exist in brick-and-mortar form. This is in 
contrast to online advertising and marketplaces, which are simply new ways of 
providing existing products or services. Therefore, when examining the relevant 
market for social networking sites (as well as other products or services unique to the 
Internet which may already exist, or have yet to be invented) the market definition 
will be narrow enough to capture only web-based companies.
 This idea of a narrow market definition is illustrated in LiveUniverse, Inc. v. 
MySpace, Inc.138 In that case, the plaintiff alleged the relevant product market in 
which MySpace operates to be Internet-based social networking.139 On a motion to 
dismiss, the Central District of California discussed whether this market definition 
was sufficiently alleged and held that it was.140 Although the defendant claimed that 
businesses other than social networking Web sites competed in the relevant market, 
135. In re eBay Antitrust Litig., 545 F.Supp. 2d 1027, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Brownlee v. Applied 
Biosystems, Inc., No. 88 20672, 1989 WL 53864, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1989)).
136. Id. at 1032–33. On a subsequent motion for summary judgment brought by eBay, the court maintained 
that the plaintiffs had raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the online auction market is a viable 
relevant market definition. In re eBay, 2010 WL 760433, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2010). The court 
nevertheless granted summary judgment in favor of eBay because the plaintiffs failed to proffer any 
evidence that eBay’s alleged anticompetitive acts actually caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. at *14. This 
case, therefore, leaves open the question as to whether the online auction market is a viable relevant 
market definition for antitrust purposes. 
137. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43739, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007).
138. Id.
139. Id. at *10.
140. Id. at *19.
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there was no argument that brick-and-mortar businesses competed in the relevant 
market.141
 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the types of brick-and-mortar businesses that 
would compete with social networking Web sites. It is even difficult to imagine the 
types of Internet businesses that would compete with social networking Web sites. 
For example, in response to the defendant’s argument that online dating sites should 
be included in the relevant market with social networking sites, the court in 
LiveUniverse stated that “[a]lthough social networking web sites may also be used for 
dating, if MySpace suddenly were to shut down, its members would not fill the social 
void by turning to online dating sites. Instead, they would likely set up profiles on a 
different social networking website.”142
 Given that there are no readily identifiable functional substitutes for social 
networking Web sites, courts will likely continue to define the relevant product 
market for these sites in a manner that only includes web-based businesses. Even if 
courts conclude that there are substitutes for social networking Web sites, these 
substitutes will be unlikely to exist in brick-and-mortar businesses. Therefore, the 
relevant market definition for social networking Web sites will still be narrow enough 
to include only web-based businesses.
 B. Implications
 Although companies have emerged that seemingly dominate the Internet and 
appear to exercise market power, courts will often define the relevant antitrust market 
broadly to include brick-and-mortar competitors that operate and conduct business 
beyond the Internet. In a case where the market is defined broadly, a company that 
appears to dominate the Internet will not face antitrust liability for alleged 
anticompetitive behavior because it does not exercise power in the broader relevant 
market.
 This is not to suggest that courts will define the relevant market broadly in all 
cases involving Internet giants suspected of behaving in an anticompetitive manner. 
Only Internet companies that have developed a new product which is exclusive to the 
Internet (e.g., social networking sites) will fall into a narrowly defined relevant 
market, while companies that have simply developed a new method for delivering 
existing products or services (e.g., advertising and retailing companies) will be part of 
a broader relevant market. Therefore, companies in the former category will be more 
vulnerable to antitrust liability, while the converse will be true for those companies 
in the latter category.
V. COnCLUsiOn
The Internet has grown immensely from its primitive days as the idea for a “Galactic 
Network” and a handful of computers. Its growth and development, especially over 
141. Id. at *17–19.
142. Id. at *19.
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the last decade, have led to the emergence of “global gargantuan” firms, the likes of 
which were probably unimaginable in the early days of the Internet. These firms, due 
to their size, are likely to be at the center of antitrust scrutiny in the future, though 
it is not currently clear how courts will define the relevant antitrust market when 
cases involving these giants present themselves.
 If and when these predicted antitrust cases come before the courts, the relevant 
market definition will likely depend upon whether brick-and-mortar substitutes are 
available for a given product or service, or whether that product or service is available 
from an Internet-based business only. Internet businesses such as advertisers and 
retailers will likely fall into the former category and comprise a broadly defined 
market, while businesses such as social networking Web sites will likely fall into the 
latter category and comprise a narrowly defined market. The implication of these 
definitions is two-fold: First, when Internet firms come under antitrust scrutiny, 
only firms that fall into the latter category will face antitrust liability. Second, simply 
because a firm dominates the Internet does not mean that it dominates the market 
for the product that it sells.
